Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(01)

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(01)

The rise to power of Phibunsonggram in December 1938 coincided with a crisis in Europe and the Munich Agreement as well as Japan’s declaration in favor of a New Order in East Asia, known as the “Toa Shin Chitsujo.” This formula was amended to the New Order in Greater East Asia or Dai Toa Chitsujo, which was declared on August 1,1940.

Although Thailand was not included in the original “New Order in East Asia”, which was announced on November 3, 1938, it was included in a Japanese plan for military operations in South-East Asia.

This plan was drafted in late 1938 jointly by the Japanese pending approval by the Japanese Emperor. The plan indicated that the Japanese would land troops at Songkhla, in the southern part of Thailand, and proceed to seize Malaya and Singapore, the British naval base.

The Landing of the troops at Songkhla, at the suggestion of the Japanese Emperor, required approval from Thailand, so as not to violate its declared policy of neutrality.

Given the cordial background of Thai-Japanese relations, reinforced by the belief that without Japanese encouragement Phibunsonggram would not have committed himself to an anti-French policy during the period between 193731938, the French were alarmed over the attitude of the Phibunsonggram Government.

They were not sure of the attitude likely to be adopted if France were to become involved in a major war. In early 1938 Phibunsonggram was well aware of this concern. To calm the French fears he invited a French naval squadron as well as a military delegation from Indo-China to visit Thailand.

The latter were taken on a visit to northeast Thailand specifically to see that the Thais still respected the non-militarized zone and had not granted the Japanese military facilities there.

Despite this Thai initiative, the French representative at an Anglo-French Military Conference in Singapore in July 1939 alleged that there was a military pact between Thailand and Japan.

On the same occasion the French pressed the British representatives to take diplomatic action  “with a view to obtaining from Siam assurance of benevolent neutrality in case of war with Japan which would allow passage of troops and munitions of war between British and French territory via Siam.”

However, Britain did not agree to such an idea. Sir Josiah Crosby, the British Minister in Bangkok, advised the Foreign Office to the effect that “I depreciate very strongly any such suggestion which would certainly be refused and would alarm and antagonize Siamese who have been assured repeatedly that we insist upon nothing more from them than absolute neutrality,”

As the British had rejected the idea of “benevolent neutrality”, the French then proposed concluding a non-aggression pacts with Thailand.

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(02)

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(2)

In August 1939, a month before the outbreak of war in Europe, Paul Lepissier, the French Minister in Bangkok, approached Prime Minister Phibunsonggram, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, with a request that Thailand signed a non-aggression pact with France, in which two main themes—not-invasion and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means—would be stressed.

A non-aggression pact with France was irrelevant to the irredentism and Pan-Thai feeling shared among younger officers in the Navy and the Army. No sooner had the French Minister approached Phubunsonggram than those younger officers expressed their opposition to any policy of appeasement to the French.

“Yudhagos”, a Thai military magazine, published an article “ Wake Up, Thais”, referring to the 19 million T’ai living in British, French and Chinese territories and called upon them to join the other 14 million T’ai who inhabited Thailand.

The articles dealt in provocative fashion with the various cessions of territory during the previous 100 years. Phibunsonggram was fully aware of this internal factor; more than once before August 1939 he had rejected such a pact.

Phibunsonggram, however, also took into account the prevailing situation abroad. In 1939 he considered that French Indo-China was militarily stronger than two years previously when he had committed himself to an anti-French policy.

Reinforcement of arms and troops was still taking place in the colony in order to meet any threat from Japanese in the North and the Thais in the West.

The Anglo-French Military Conference in Singapore in July 1939 caused Phibunsongggram greater anxiety, for it meant not only that the French would co-operate with the British in dealings with the Japanese, but also that they could work militarily with British in dealings with the Thais.

Phibunsonggram’s fear of the French was expressed to the British to the effect that he was worried by French military preparations in Indo-China. Indeed he could see no better way of stopping rumors of a French invasion than by the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.

Phibunsonggram, therefore, accepted the French proposal for the pact, but on condition that France should adjust boundaries along the Mekong River on the basis on the thalweg principle, with the effect that Thailand would regain some islets in the river.

If France agreed, the Thais would adopt a procedure for negotiations with France in line with those employed when they negotiated the previous Franco-Thai Convention of 1925.

In other words, any islets near to the Thai shore should belong to Thailand for administrative convenience and the Thais should recognize all islands as belongings to French Indo-China.

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(03)

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(03)

The Thai Premier no doubt placed a pre-condition on the non-aggression pact to cool off the Thai irredentists. He also sought to extend the scope of the pact to include Britain and Japan so as, in part, to be in line with Thailand’s declared policy of absolute neutrality, and also to draw in the two powers to balance France.

This latter decision was made on the advise of the liberals in the Cabinet as well as of Prince Varnvaidayakorn, Adviser to the Prime Minister and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The liberals’ “neutrality” stance was in turn supported by Colonel Luang Promyodhi, the Deputy Minister of Defense and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

The Thai Premier, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, then summoned the French, British, and Japanese Ministers in Bangkok, and submitted separate Aide Memoires to them respectively on 26,27 and 28 October 1939.

The gist of the Aide Memoires submitted to the three Ministers was in the main identical. It indicated the Thai government’s intention to sign a non-aggression pact with the tree states with the aim of strengthening mutual peaceful and friendly relations.

But in the second paragraph of the Aide Memoire to the French Minister, a request was added for re-adjustment of the boundaries in the Mekong River, employing the thalweg as a riverine boundary line in accordance with the accepted principle in International Law.This was for mutual administrative convenience in the river, the Aide Memoire said.

This request for French re-adjustment of the boundary in the Mekong River was not kept secret; it appeared in the Aide Memoires which were submitted to the Japanese and the British Ministers.

The French did not want to make any concessions in return for the non-aggression pact initiated by themselves. As they did not respond over the border issue, Prime Minister Phibunsonggram asked Britain to help persuade the French to agree as the territory to be ceded by the French had only a sentiment value.

But Britain decided to leave the matter to Thailand and France alone, while the Thai government, whose intention was to play Japan and Britain off against France, decided to go ahead with negotiations with Japan and Britain in order to isolate the French government.

Fortunately for the Thais, Britain accepted their proposal for a non-aggression pact. Sir Josiah Crosby, the British Minister in Bangkok, recommended the Foreign Office to “do their utmost to reconcile the French to our signing it(the pact) even if they have to go without one themselves.”

The pact, as Crosby saw, would (1) help stabilize the international situation in South-East Asia,(2) prevent Phibunsonggram from turning, in dungeon, to the side of Japan, with Thailand becoming a spring board for an attack on Malaya and Singapore, and(3) diminish Japanese influence in Thailand and increase British influence in proportion.

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(04)

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(04)

Crosby based this conclusion on three main assumptions: (1) Phibunsonggram had pressed for the pact with the British in the hope of forcing the hand of the French, (2) he was very anxious to gain kudos at home and abroad by making Thailand the first country in the Far East to sign a non-aggression pact with another Power, and (3) he was at the same time genuinely interested in taking a step which would help to establish the international situation in South-East Asia.

Despite its suspicion of the Thai game of playing off the French and the British against each other, The British Foreign Office did not think that there was much harm in the French being pressed to be reasonable about the adjustment of boundaries along the Mekong River.

It decided to inform the French government that Britain would be prepared to negotiate an agreement with Thailand irrespective of the outcome of the latter’s negotiations with France over the Mekong issue.

The Thai government took advantage of Britain’s sympathetic attitude. It went so far as to agree with Josiah Crosby to set February 1940 as time limit for negotiations with France.

At the same time the Thai government put pressure on the French Minister in Bangkok by informing him that if a favorable decision about the Mekong was not reached by the end of February Britain would be prepared to negotiate separately with the Thais.

On March 12, 1940, for fear of being isolated, the French government in Paris and the government of French Indo-China agreed in principle on two main points: (1) negotiations on the issue of the islets and islands in the Mekong River based on administrative and navigational convenience, and (2) negotiations on the remaining unsolved matters (including the problems of the river patrol police, the fishing and navigation in the Mekong River, as well as a lease of forestry and the problems of French subjects residing in Thailand).The French government agreed to send high ranking officials from Paris to negotiate with the Thai side on these two points.

Negotiations with France and Britain on the non-aggression pacts came to fruition in April 1940. The Anglo-Thai and Franco-Thai pacts contained five and six articles respectively; the gist of which was more or less identical.

In Article 1, each contracting party undertook not to resort in any case either to war or to any act of violence or of aggression against the other, either alone, or in concert with one, or more than one, third Power, and to respect the territorial integrity of the other contracting party.

Article 2 stipulated that if one of the contracting parties was the object of an act of war or of aggression on the part of one,  or more than one, third Power, the other contracting party undertook not to give, either directly or indirectly, aid or assistance to the aggressor or aggressors for the duration of the present treaty.

The second part of this article also stipulated that if one of the contracting parties committed an act of war or of aggression against a third Power, the other contracting party should have the right to terminate the present treaty immediately without notice. France in particular badly needed this provision as a deterrent against Thai ambitions in Indo-China.

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(05)

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(05)

In Article 5, each contracting party undertook to respect in every way the sovereignty or authority of the other contracting party over her territories; neither one should intervene in any way in the internal affairs of such territories and should abstain from any action calculated to give rise to or assist any agitation, propaganda or attempted intervention aimed against the integrity of any such territory which had for its purpose the change by force of the form of government of any such territory. This Article seemed likely to oblige the Thai irredentists to give up their desire of regaining the ceded territories from Britain and France.

The Japanese had not yet replied, when the British and French agreed to sign the pacts. At first the Japanese did not appear to favor participation in a non-aggression pact with Thailand. This was certainly because it was deemed irrelevant to Japan’s policy of southward advance, in which Thailand would be used for passage of its troops to attack the British in Burma and Malaya.

However, the Japanese, in their diplomatic race with France and Britain, changed their minds, and, furthermore, wanted an agreement of a “definite” nature. They were unwilling to adopt the model of the non-aggression pacts accepted by Britain and France. 

Two reasons were furnished: one was that they did not wish to offend the Axis Powers by appearing to associate themselves too closely with the Allies; the other was that there was as yet no precedent for Japan to sign a non-aggression pact with another country.

The Japanese agreed in principle to the signing of a non-aggression pact provided that its name could be changed into “Treaty Between Japan and Thailand Concerning the Continuance of Friendly Relations Between the Two Countries and the Mutual Respect for Each Other’s Territorial Integrity”, and that an article, which stipulated : There shall be an exchange of information and consultation on the matters which involve mutual interests” would be added. Furthermore, the Japanese requested that the treaty be signed in Tokyo instead of Bangkok.

In a meeting on April 26, 1940 many members of the Thai Cabinet expressed opposition to Japan’s desire to conclude a treaty with a different title to that of Britain and France.

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(06)

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(06)

Furthermore, they rejected its demand to put in the pact an article which stipulated an exchange of information and consultation on matters of mutual interest. They were of the opinion that such article would indicate their country’s special friendship with Japan.

They also questioned the same of the Japanese-proposed pact as inappropriate. Colonel Luang  Promyodhi, the Deputy Minister of Defense and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, suspected that the Japanese might interpret the pact in different manner from its spirit if and when opportunities arose.

Premier Phibunsonggram, however, softened his approach towards the Japanese in the hope of gaining their assistance in case Thailand did claim the ceded territories from France.

Accordingly, he tried to persuade a majority of his Cabinet to accept Japan’s proposals, by reasoning that ”We hall have no objection to the proposals as we have nothing to lose.”

The Cabinet then agreed to all of Japan’s demands, but not without a request that Japan include an article, stipulating that “The contracting parties shall not be involved in each other’s political regimes.” This article was supposed to prevent Japan from interfering in the internal affairs of Thailand.

However, the Thai demand was flatly rejected by the Japanese for three reasons(1) Japan wished to avoid having a treaty containing wording similar to Thailand’s pact with Britain and France, (2) Japan did not have territories adjoining Thailand and (3) the article in question seemed likely to constitute lese-majeste against the Japanese Emperor and it would limit the freedom of the contracting parties.

Japan’s insistence was not opposed by the Thai Cabinet. For their part, the Thais would not agree to an additional demand that Japan sign the treaty one or two days before the signing of the non-aggression pacts with Britain and France.

Direk Jayanama, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and also one of the liberals in the Cabinet, reasoned that it would be a damaging blow to national pride for the Japan’s demand to be accepted by the Thai Government, and insisted that the Japanese treaty be signed on the same day as that of France and Britain.

Premier Phibunsonggram, to ensure the liberals’ loyalty to the regime and also to transfer their personal allegiance from Pridi Banomyong, his political rival, to himself, accepted Direk’s viewpoint and ruled out the Japanese demand.

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(07)

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(07)

The non-aggression pacts were finally concluded with France and Britain on June 12, 1940 at Suan Kulap Palace in Bangkok. In Tokyo on the same day and at the same time the Japanese-Thai treaty was signed between Hachiro Arita, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Phya Sisena, the Thai Minister in Tokyo.

The Japanese-Thai treaty contained 5 comparatively short articles. In Article 1, the contracting parties agreed to mutually respect each other’s territorial integrity and reaffirmed the constant peace and the perpetual friendship existing between them.

Article 2 stipulated that the contracting parties should maintain friendly contacts in order to exchange information, and to consult one another, on any question of common interest that might arise.

In Article 3, in addition to guaranteeing mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity each contracting party undertook not to assist any third party by which the other might be attacked.

It was through Article 2 that the Japanese obtained something of a more definite nature, which gave cause for concern to the British. Sir Josiah Crosby questioned Direk Jayanama as to whether this could be taken as a pledge of alliance, but the latter replied in the negative.

Accordingly, the Anglo-Thai and Japanese-Thai treaties were ratified on August 31, and December 23, 1940 respectively. But the ratifications of the Franco-Thai non-aggression pact were not exchanged because of the change in political situation in France.