Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(03)

Thailand’s Non-aggression Pacts with Britain, France and Japan(03)

The Thai Premier no doubt placed a pre-condition on the non-aggression pact to cool off the Thai irredentists. He also sought to extend the scope of the pact to include Britain and Japan so as, in part, to be in line with Thailand’s declared policy of absolute neutrality, and also to draw in the two powers to balance France.

This latter decision was made on the advise of the liberals in the Cabinet as well as of Prince Varnvaidayakorn, Adviser to the Prime Minister and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The liberals’ “neutrality” stance was in turn supported by Colonel Luang Promyodhi, the Deputy Minister of Defense and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

The Thai Premier, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, then summoned the French, British, and Japanese Ministers in Bangkok, and submitted separate Aide Memoires to them respectively on 26,27 and 28 October 1939.

The gist of the Aide Memoires submitted to the three Ministers was in the main identical. It indicated the Thai government’s intention to sign a non-aggression pact with the tree states with the aim of strengthening mutual peaceful and friendly relations.

But in the second paragraph of the Aide Memoire to the French Minister, a request was added for re-adjustment of the boundaries in the Mekong River, employing the thalweg as a riverine boundary line in accordance with the accepted principle in International Law.This was for mutual administrative convenience in the river, the Aide Memoire said.

This request for French re-adjustment of the boundary in the Mekong River was not kept secret; it appeared in the Aide Memoires which were submitted to the Japanese and the British Ministers.

The French did not want to make any concessions in return for the non-aggression pact initiated by themselves. As they did not respond over the border issue, Prime Minister Phibunsonggram asked Britain to help persuade the French to agree as the territory to be ceded by the French had only a sentiment value.

But Britain decided to leave the matter to Thailand and France alone, while the Thai government, whose intention was to play Japan and Britain off against France, decided to go ahead with negotiations with Japan and Britain in order to isolate the French government.

Fortunately for the Thais, Britain accepted their proposal for a non-aggression pact. Sir Josiah Crosby, the British Minister in Bangkok, recommended the Foreign Office to “do their utmost to reconcile the French to our signing it(the pact) even if they have to go without one themselves.”

The pact, as Crosby saw, would (1) help stabilize the international situation in South-East Asia,(2) prevent Phibunsonggram from turning, in dungeon, to the side of Japan, with Thailand becoming a spring board for an attack on Malaya and Singapore, and(3) diminish Japanese influence in Thailand and increase British influence in proportion.